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impact of social security reforms, in terms of both budgetary implications and distributional effects. 
This is done by simulating the effects of three hypothetical reforms, plus the effects of the 1995-
reform of the Italian pension system (the so-called Dini reform). Our approach relies on the use of a 
semi-structural econometric model to predict retirement probabilities under different policy scenarios, 
so as to properly take into account the behavioral effects of the reforms. On the basis of the estimated 
retirement model, we develop a complete accounting exercise which includes not only changes in 
gross future benefits due to policy changes, but also changes in social security contributions, income 
taxes and value added taxes.  Thus, our results provide not only estimates of the workers’ gains or 
losses, but also an exhaustive evaluation of the gains and losses for the government budget.  
We find that the reforms, particularly the Dini reform (once fully phased in), have a substantial 
impact on individuals’ retirement decisions and their net social security wealth, as well as substantial 
gains for the government finances. 
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provisional characte 1. Introduction 
  A “good” pension reform should address a number of issues. One important aspect is 
the financial soundness of the system, particularly in the light of the legacy that we leave to 
future generations. Policy makers should also address economic efficiency at two levels: no 
waste of resources for a given contribution rate (or for a given benefit level), and no distortions 
of individual choices (or at least minimize distortions). The main distortions associated with a 
pension system or with its reform have to do with saving and labor supply behavior.  
Italy has seen a flurry of reforms during the 1990s, and economists and policy makers 
are still struggling to assess the results and the long-term effects of these reforms. Many analysts 
argue that the overall design of the recent Italian reforms is probably a good one, and yet more 
steps need to be taken to speed up the reform process and reap the benefits which, due the 
adverse demographic trends, could easily evaporate. 
  In this paper, we contribute to the current debate on the Italian pension system by 
analyzing the impact of social security reforms, in terms of both budgetary implications and 
distributional effects. This is done by simulating the effects of three hypothetical reforms, plus 
the effects of the 1995-reform of the Italian pension system (the so-called Dini reform). Our 
approach relies on the use of a semi-structural econometric model to predict retirement 
probabilities under different policy scenarios, so as to properly take into account the behavioral 
effects of the reforms. On the basis of the estimated retirement model, we develop a complete 
accounting exercise which includes not only changes in gross future benefits due to policy 
changes, but also changes in social security contributions, income taxes and value added taxes.  
Thus, our results provide not only estimates of the workers’ gains or losses, but also an 
exhaustive evaluation of the gains and losses for the government budget.  
We find that the reforms, particularly the Dini reform (once fully phased in), have a 
substantial impact on individuals’ retirement decisions and their net social security wealth, as 
well as substantial gains for the government finances. 
 
2. An overview of the Italian pension system and its reforms 
  Before turning to the analysis of different social security reforms, it seems useful to 
briefly describe the reform process which has taken place in Italy, and the recent developments 
in the political arena.  The growing concern of the European Union with meeting the targets 
imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact has contributed to develop a debate on the effects of the recent reforms and the need for further reforms. It should be mentioned that Italy, along with 
the other member states of the EU, committed itself to increase the effective retirement age of 5 
years by the year 2010. Specific targets have also been set on participation rates of older 
workers.   
Many argue that the changes of the 1990s may be inadequate in the light of future demographic 
trends, and that it is imperative to raise the effective retirement age. Empirical work carried out 
on the issue shows that there is a strong relationship between the tax incentives to retire and the 
age at which men are observed to retire in different countries
1.  For Italy, we still observe a 
substantial number of early retirees.
2  Therefore, an evaluation of the impact and efficacy of the 
reforms, which has already started with a Ministerial Committee
3 appointed by the Italian 
Welfare Ministry, is of crucial importance.  
The reforms of the 1990s have tackled several aspects of the Italian social security 
system, but three are particularly relevant: (i) benefit computation rules; (2) indexation rules, 
and (3) retirement age and eligibility criteria.
4  It is useful to recall that the vast majority of the 
population  is insured with the  National Institute for Social Security (INPS), and since this 
paper focuses attention on the most important fund administered by the INPS, the Private Sector 
Employees Fund (FPLD, our description of the reforms will mainly focus on the changes taking 
place for private sector employees.   
A first reform (known as the Amato reform) was passed by Parliament in 1992. Once 
phased in, it would reduce pension outlays and iron out major differences between various 
sectors and occupations. However, this reform changed only marginally the rules governing 
early retirement and, according to many, did not produce the much needed savings in the 
budget.  Hence the second reform (the so-called Dini reform) of 1995.This reform totally 
changed some of the basic rules for granting benefits to future retirees and tried to harmonize 
the actuarial rates of return for early and late retirees. Table 1 summarizes some of the key 
features of three regimes: the regime prevailing before the Amato reform (denoted as Pre-1993 
regime),  the one prevailing during the transition (currently in place),  and  the one prevailing 
with the Dini reform fully in place (post-1995-Regime). However both the Amato and Dini 
reforms are characterized by a very long transitional period affecting all the cohorts of post-
                                                      
1 The concept of an “implicit tax” was introduced by Gruber and Wise (1999). 
2 See Brugiavini and Peracchi (2001) and Brugiavini, Peracchi and Wise (2001). 
3 Relazione Finale della Commissione Ministeriale di “Verifica del sistema previdenziale ai sensi della legge 335/95 
e successivi provvedimenti, nell’ottica della competitività, dello sviluppo e dell’equità”, October 2001. 
4 For a description of Italian social security system before 1992, see Brugiavini (1999), Brugiavini and Peracchi 
(2001) and Franco (2002). 1992-retirees: the provisions for  the  transitional periods involve a pro rata method of 
establishing eligibility and benefit computation criteria on the basis of seniority.  
 
2.1 The Dini reform and recent assessments of the reform process  
The Dini reform adopts a defined-contribution method of benefit calculation. The first benefit is 
the annuity equivalent to the present value (at retirement) of past payroll taxes, capitalised by 
means of a 5-years moving average of nominal GDP growth-rates. The relevant payroll tax rate 
is 33% and an age-related actuarial adjustment factor is applied to the resulting figure.
5 In this 
case too, capping is applied (on the present value of contributions, rather than on pensionable 
earnings). The 1995 reform introduced – at the steady state - a  window of pensionable ages 
with an associated actuarially-based adjustment of pensions. This window goes from age 57 to 
age 65, with “actuarial adjustment factors” of 4.720% and 6.136% respectively. These 
coefficients, which make the present value of future benefits equal to capitalised contributions, 
can be revised every ten years on the basis of changes in life expectancy and a comparison of 
the rates of growth of GDP and earnings assessed for payroll taxes.  It should be noted that, 
even at the steady state, the system will not achieve complete age-neutrality given the mortality 
prospects of Italian workers.
6 
Minimum contribution requirements changed from the initial 15 years, to just 5 years after 
1995.  Payroll taxes increased to 32.7% of gross earnings (to be split between employer and 
employee) from approximately 27% in 1995.   
The implementation of the reform was (and still is) extremely gradual. Workers with at 
least 18 years of contributions in 1995 will receive a pension computed on the basis of the rules 
applying before 1992. Those with less than 18 years of contributions in 1992 will be subject to a 
pro-rata regime: the 1995 reform will apply only to the contributions paid after 1995.
 7 Only 
individuals beginning to work after 1995 will receive a pension computed only on the basis of 
the new rules. Hence the length of the transition phase, and other aspects of the reform, may 
significantly reduce its expected benefits.  
 
                                                      
5 Hence the benefit is: (33%)*(adjustment factor)*(present value of SS taxes). 
6 See Barbi (2001) 
7  The benefits paid to individuals in the pro-rata regime will be computed on the basis of two 
components: the pre-1995 contributions and the contributions paid from 1995 onwards. A first round of evaluations of the reforms became available throughout the 1990s. 
Some of these evaluations were based on “generational accounting”. For example, it was 
estimated that in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances, a 5% increase in 
the taxes paid by all generations would be required. Without the pension reforms introduced in 
the 1990s, the required tax increase would have been 9%. About 40% of those employed in 
1999 could fully retire under the pre-1992 regime. For these people, the incentive to retire early 
was even increased by the expectations that retirement conditions might be tightened (Franco, 
2002).  
The Report of the Ministerial Committee published in the year 2001 shows that the 
savings obtained between 1996 and 2000 are essentially due to changes in the indexation rules 
and curtailing early retirement. The difficulty in building a complete evaluation model, that 
incorporates behavioural responses to the reforms, relies on the availability of good data and on 
the overall approach.  Brugiavini and Peracchi (2001) provide an econometric model which 
focuses on dynamic incentives but does not address fiscal implications, while other recent 
studies 
8 carry out accounting exercises that neglect the impact of policy changes on the 
retirement decisions of individuals. 
 
3. The retirement model 
The simulation exercise carried out in the present paper  relies on an econometric model of the 
retirement decision of Italian workers largely based on the work of Gruber and Wise (2001) and 
already applied to the Italian case by Brugiavini and Peracchi (2001). In the present paper we 
limit our description of the econometric work to the main features of the modeling strategy and 
to the data. An important difference with respect to Brugiavini and Peracchi (2001) is the fact 
that the availability of a new release of the data, characterized by a larger sample size, allows us 
to follow a novel approach. Therefore the underlying empirical work deserves some attention 
also in this paper.   
3.1 The data  
The retirement decision is analyzed through a reduced form model estimated on a random 
sample of administrative records from one of the INPS archives
9.  The sample is drawn from the 
                                                      
8 See Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, 2001 and  Fornero-Castellino, 2001 
9 This is a sub-sample of workers borne either on March 1
st or on October 1
st of any possible year contained in the 
Archive.  so-called INPS Workers-Archive (Archive O1M), which contains records on all private sector 
employees ensured with INPS. The information on each employee is filed in by the employer on 
a standard form containing a small number of entries. We have a random sample of these 
employees in the form of a panel covering a period of about 20 years from 1973 to 1997. The 
sample contains 200,000 workers entering the archive at any time during the period considered. 
Employment spells can last any number of years, and individuals can leave the sample and enter 
again in any subsequent year. The panel is therefore highly unbalanced. 
The main advantages of using these data are that they span a fairly long time period and contain 
information on gross earnings,  which form the basis for the calculation of social security 
benefits. However, there are several shortcomings.  
(1) The data set only covers private sector employees, leaving out public sector employees and 
the self-employed. Even for private sector employees, however, coverage is not full and a small 
fraction of them is not included. 
(2) The reason for a worker dropping off the archive is not known: in addition to retiring, 
workers could die, become self-employed or public sector employees, or simply stop working. 
(3) Important covariates (e.g. education level, spousal information and other family background 
variables) are missing. As a result, we have very few demographic controls available, we do not 
know about marital status, and cannot say much about differential mortality. 
(4) There is no information on receipt of disability or other types of benefits. 
 
The initial sample selection, carried out in order to estimate suitable earnings histories, is as 
follows. We focus on workers between 18 and 70 years of age. We drop observations for which 
one important indicator (such as age) is missing and individuals who work less than 26 days a 
year. We also exclude from the analysis workers belonging to special INPS funds (nursery 
school teachers, local authorities employees, etc.)
10.  
3.2 Earnings projection and transitions to retirement 
In order to estimate earnings profiles and eventually measure social security wealth, we further 
select the sample by including only workers who are present in the sample for an uninterrupted 
period of at least five years (workers often appear for one year and then disappear from the 
sample for a long spell). The 5-year minimum requirement is motivated by the fact that this 
corresponds to the minimum contributive period under the 1995 reform. We only keep workers 
                                                      
10 We could include these observations to add variability across funds, but these workers represent only a small 
number (less than 100 observations) and tend to exhibit many gaps in their careers. who do not have substantial gaps (more than 10 years missing) in their records. This is because 
we cannot say whether in that time span they were engaged in other labor market or non-labor 
market activities (such as maternity leaves, or undertaking further education). The choice of a 
10-year interval is arbitrary and is based on a preliminary inspection of the data
11. 
The information available in order to model age-earnings profiles in the INPS sample consists 
of age, gender, occupation, sector of employment and region of working activity
12.  
The specification of a model for the age-earnings profile represents an essential step in the 
estimation of social security wealth at the individual level. This is especially important in Italy, 
as the process of social security reform involves moving from a “final salary” type of benefit 
formula (pre-1993 system) to a formula based on the value of lifetime contributions (1995 
reform).
13 Below we describe additional hypothetical reforms, which also involve extending the 
benefit calculation period.  
The earnings-modeling strategy is as follows: individual real age-earnings profiles are modelled 
with individual fixed effects in order to fill gaps of one or two years in workers’ career. The 
profile is assumed to be completely flat after the last year of observed earnings. This 
corresponds to the assumption that, at the individual level, the real earnings process is a random 
walk with no drift. In practice, the “jump-off” point for the earnings projections is taken to be 
the average of the last three years of observed earnings. This jump-off point pins down the level 
of the age-earnings profile for each individual.
14 Note that this might seem to underestimate 
future earnings growth, particularly for younger cohorts, but since our “sample at risk” (as 
defined below) consists mainly of older cohorts, the problem may not be too severe
15. 
Furthermore, for ages above 50, earnings are lower on average and very noisy, possibly because 
                                                      
11 It should be noted that, in order to gain variability in social security benefits, we did experiment with a larger 
sample including almost all workers, regardless of the existence of gaps in their careers. However, this did not add 
valuable information as the majority of workers with substantial spells out of the private sector would end up 
qualifying for minimum benefits (the level of which is fixed by legislation each year) or for an old age income 
guarantee (pensione sociale). Hence there would be very little correlation between earnings histories and pension 
benefits for these individuals, and the effects of potential reforms in changing the incentives to retire would be 
negligible (these workers would basically qualify for the minimum benefit under all regimes). Therefore these cases 
would end up blurring the results rather than adding variability to be exploited. Finally, our choice of the ten years 
threshold and the requirement of a minimum of five years presence in the archive give us an estimated sample 
percentage of minimum benefit recipients which is not too far from what observed in the universe of pension awards 
as recorded by the INPS Administration (see Table 2.4).    
  
12 This is actually the region where the firm is located. Hence a comparison with the SHIW and national accounts 
data reveals that there seems to be a higher number of workers located in the North-West, where many large firms 
have their headquarters. 
13 In this and in the following sections we only describe results for the 1995 reform, results for the other cases are 
available on request from the authors. 
14 When going backward, the jump-off point corresponds to the average of the first three observations available for 
each individual.  
15 The cohorts at risk are defined according to year of birth: for the oldest cohort these are between 1918 and 1926, 
for the next cohort 1927-1936 and for the youngest cohort 1937-1944. of part-time work or the coexistence of early retirement benefits and working activities. When 
going backward, using a flat earnings profile would grossly overestimate the level of earnings at 
earlier ages and grossly underestimate real earnings growth. To avoid this problem, individual 
earnings are assumed to grow at the annual growth rate of aggregate earnings, for the years 
when this information is available, and at a constant real rate of 1.5% otherwise.
16  
Notice that our first data point is in 1973, while we need to go back to the 1930’s for some of 
our workers in order to complete their working history. Hence, we would be forced to use a 
procedure which makes use of aggregate growth rates when projecting backwards into the 
distant past. Also, in projecting earnings forward, individuals are assumed to form expectations 
by “using the model”. In other words, for each age we only use actual earnings up to that age, 
and project earnings from that age forward according to the forecasting model. 
 
At the moment we have  no information on the reasons for which workers  leave the archive. 
Thus, in order to use these data we have to make the strong assumption that every exit from the 
archive is due to retirement. In fact, rather than retiring, a worker could have died, or moved 
from private sector employment to public sector employment or to self-employment. Our 
identifying assumption is that, over the range of ages that we consider (from age 50 to 65), exit 
from the INPS archive is due to retirement and not to other reasons. This assumption is not in 
contrast with what we observe in an alternative sample provided by the Bank of Italy (Survey of 
household income and wealth-SHIW), where we have available the full set of information 
concerning the occupational status of individuals in each year 
17. As for mortality, in the 
simulation we will purge the exits of the component which we can impute to the probability of 
death by age, sex and cohort. 
For Italian workers, the only relevant alternative escape route from the labor force could 
be via disability. Many other bridging plans exist, but they would all fall in the category of “pre-
retirement” or “early-retirement” and, in our data, they would effectively correspond to 
retirement. We argue that these exits via disability are non particularly relevant in our sample 
because, after the changes legislated in 1984, their importance as an escape route has greatly 
                                                      
16 Aggregate earnings are equal to the earnings series put together by Rossi, Sorgato and Toniolo (1993) for the years 
before 1970 and to national account statistics for subsequent years up to 1999. 
 
17 In the SHIW sample different definitions of pensioner are available, based on self-reported occupational status, on 
earnings and on benefits receipts. However no marked difference in the distribution of retired people by age emerged 
from adopting different definitions.  diminished and in  the age range that we consider (50 to 70), the number of disability pensions 
is negligible relative to old age pensions
18.    
Figure 1 presents the non parametric retirement hazard based on the INPS sample for men and 
women. For men there is an important spike at age 60, but the hazard is not flat at younger ages, 
whereas for women there are several important ages at which the conditional probability of 
leaving the labor force peaks.  
 
3.3  Definition of social security wealth and incentive measures 
 
Key ingredients of the econometric model are two concepts: the social security wealth and 
related dynamic incentives. It is useful to briefly recap these concepts.  
For a worker of age a, we define social security wealth (SSW) in case of retirement at age h 
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1
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s π β ρ
− =  is a discount factor that depends on the rate of 
time discount ß and the survival probability  s π  at age s conditional on being alive at age h, and 
B(h) is the pension benefit expected at age  1 + ≥ h s  in case of retirement at age h. Pension 
benefits are net of income taxes. Given the SSW, we define three incentive measures for a 
worker of age a. 
 
1. Social security accrual (SSA) is the difference in SSW from postponing retirement from age a 
to age a+1 
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The SSA is negative if the expected present value of pension benefits foregone by postponing 
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the increment in the flow of pension benefits. The rescaled negative accrual  1 / + − = a a a W SSA τ , 
                                                      
18 See Brugiavini and Peracchi 2001 for a more detailed discussion. where  1 + a W  are expected net earnings at age a+1 based on the information available up to age 
a, is called the implicit tax/subsidy of postponing retirement from age a to age a+1. 
 
2. Peak value:  () a h h a SSW SSW PV − = max ,  h = a+1,..,R , where R is the mandatory 
retirement age (the latter does not exist in Italy, but given the retirement evidence we find it 
reasonable to put R = 70). Thus, the peak value is the maximum difference in SSW between 
retiring at future ages and retiring at the current age.  
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is the intertemporal utility of retiring at age h > a. Thus the option value is the maximum utility 
difference between retiring at future ages and retiring at age a. We parameterize the model by 











If expected earnings are constant at  a W (as assumed in our earnings model), then  
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That is, the peak value and the option value are proportional to each other except for the effect 
due to the term ∑ + =
h
a s s 1ρ . 
In the actual calculation of SSW we assume a real discount factor of 1.5 percent (β = .985). 
Benefits are defined in real terms and the indexation rules prevailing under each legislation are 
implemented (e.g. in the baseline we apply indexation to both price inflation and real wages). 
We also assume that real earnings growth after 1997 (the last year of the INPS sample), is 
constant at 1.5%. Estimation of SSW is carried out separately for men and women. Household social security 
wealth is obtained simply as the man’s social security wealth when the wife does not work. In 
estimating the model, we also had to deal with the fact that the actual age of entry into the labor 
market is not always known. We used the information on the initial occupational level to get a 
reasonable proxy for educational attainments. This was then used to impute an initial age for the 
worker’s contributive history.  
 Eligibility rules and benefit computation rules prevailing under each regime are rather complex 
(see Section 2), and some shortcuts were made. Finally, we computed social security wealth net 
of income tax, by subtracting from gross pension benefits income taxes as due. 
 
3.4 The reduced form retirement model: methodology and estimation results 
In this section we present the results of modeling exit into retirement using probit models that 
include, in addition to a standard set of covariates (such as age, occupation and sector), the 
incentive measures discussed in the previous section.  
The response variable is a binary indicator, representing exit from the INPS sample between the 
year t and the year t +1. The population at risk consists of workers aged between 50 and 70 in 
any of the relevant years. The sample used for estimation includes all consecutive  pairs of years 
from 1980-1981 through to 1996-1997. We restrict the analysis to individuals at risk after 1980: 
the reason is twofold. First, it is very hard to capture the behaviour of workers taking into 
account all the institutional changes affecting the various cohorts over a long time span. An 
advantage of the period between 1980 and 1992 is that it is a relatively stable period in terms of 
policy changes. Second, because in some cases we have to model earnings profiles going back 
fifty years, given the existing limitations on aggregate wage data it is reasonable to limit the 
time horizon to recent years. In this way, our oldest worker is aged 70 in 1980 and we only need 
to back-cast earnings to the year 1930
19.   
The social security regime is assumed to be the transitional one introduced in 1992 (see 
Table 1).  This is the relevant regime for the workers in our sample, who would not yet 
experience the changes introduced by the 1995 reform through the sample period. Overall, using 
the pre-1993 rules instead, would lead to negligible differences in terms of social security 
wealth and eligibility. This is because, as already mentioned, the rights of workers near 
                                                      
19 Retirement is not mandatory. Given that we assume an individual at risk up to age 70, and given that we cannot 
exclude that she started working at age 20, we cannot rule out the possibility that this individual worked for fifty 
years. retirement were changed only marginally by the 1992 reform: according to seniority, most 
workers at risk would fully retire under the pre-1993 rules.  
For each incentive measure, two basic specifications are considered, for a total of six estimated 
models. The incentive variables are: the accrual, the peak value and the option value whereas 
the dependence of the retirement hazard on age is modelled either through a simple linear age 
term or through a full set of age dummies. All specifications include a set of sectoral and 
regional indicators and a set of earnings measures relevant for the retirement choice. Differently 
from our previous work and from other countries which contribute to the project, we only use 
two “resource” measures capturing the level of social security wealth and the trade off between 
benefits and labor earnings: net social security wealth and pensionable earnings respectively
20. 
The additional variable measuring future earnings, which we included in previous studies, is left 
out because, in the Italian case, a multicollinearity problem emerges under the baseline and the 
transitional period
21. The problem is caused by the way benefits are computed: pensionable 
earnings, which form the basis of our social security wealth estimate, are the average of the last 
five years earnings, and in many cases this takes the same value of (or a very close value to) 
one-step-ahead projected earnings.   
 
Results for the specification with age dummies are summarized in Table 3: each column refers 
to a particular incentive variable and we report only the estimated coefficients of the variables 
of interest. It should be noted that the purpose of the estimation here is not to produce a “good 
fit”, but rather to create a basis for the simulation exercise by adopting a parsimonious 
specification
22. The use of age dummies increases the fit relative to the model with a linear age 
term, but only marginally. This suggests that age is an important determinant of retirement 
decisions but, despite the presence of spikes in the hazard, we get only marginal gains by 
making use of a fully parameterized model. Hence, these spikes may be less important than it  
first appears in explaining the age-retirement process, as most of the action comes from the exits 
taking place between age 50 and age 60. As shown in Table 3, the social security wealth 
variable and the incentive variables are, by and large, of the correct sign: of the incentive 
                                                      
20 To be more precise we use a quadratic polynomial polynomial in pensionable earnings. All continuous variables 
enter in the form of deviation from the mean. 
21 For brevity we do not report the estimates of regressions of the future earnings variable against social security 
wealth, pensionable earnings and all the relevant covariates. This regression shows the clear symptoms of 
multicollinearity, e.g. an extremely  high t-statistics for the two variables under investigation.  
22 For example, if we used year of birth cohorts results improve dramatically. variables the accrual and option value have the correct sign and are significantly different from 
zero. 
 
4. Simulating Policy Changes 
 
The aim of this section is to simulate the total fiscal implications of pension reforms. The 
hypothetical reforms, designed as described below, contain some useful elements for the debate 
currently taking place in Italy. For example the reform which we indicate as “actuarial 
adjustment” represents a change of the current  Italian system which many experts and policy 
makers advocate. We also simulate the steady state effects of the actual reform introduced in 
1995  (the so-called Dini-Reform).   
 
4.1 Social security regimes 
The baseline (R0) , i.e. the reference regime, is the social security system prevailing before 1992 
and the various regime changes are evaluated against this regime
23.  As for the reforms 
considered it is useful to provide a brief description. 
 
R1: Age Shift. This reform preserves all the features of the system but increases by three years 
the normal retirement age. Since in Italy all ages before the normal retirement age are 
potentially an early retirement age (conditional on seniority) the entire hazard is effectively 
shifted by three years. The seniority rule is preserved in its original format (see also Table1). 
 
R2: Actuarial Adjustment. This reform should achieve an actuarially fair system without 
changing any other feature of the program (i.e. no change in basic benefit calculation rules, in 
means-testing and eligibility to minimum benefits and in indexation). The normal retirement age 
is the same as for the base case and the rules in place are unchanged at that age (hence, the 
replacement ratio is the same at that age). The reform introduces an actuarial adjustment of 6% 
for each year away from the normal retirement age. Thus, benefits becoming available before 
                                                      
23 As we already pointed out the econometric model which predicts retirement is estimated on the sample of workers 
observed between 1974 and 1997, hence experiencing the transitional period. In the estimation we evaluate social 
security wealth and the incentive variables according to the rules of the transitional phase, because these are the 
incentives actually faced by individuals. However in the simulation we look at changes occurring between steady 
states. the normal retirement age receive a cut of 6% per year, while benefits becoming available after 
the normal retirement age are increased by  6%  per year.  
 
R3: Common Reform. This reform is common to all countries considered in this volume. The 
crucial feature is that, differently from the other cases, this reform envisages an ideal system, 
which represent a complete departure from the systems currently in place in many countries 
(Italy is one example) and is the same for all countries. This simulation features an early 
retirement age of 60 and a normal retirement age of 65. It provides a retiree with a benefit, 
which replaces 60% of her projected earnings when she turns 65. It applies an actuarial 
reduction of 6% per year for early claiming and an actuarial increase of 6% per year for later 




R4: The 1995 Reform. The 1995 reform adopts a notionally defined contribution method of 
benefit calculation. The first social security benefit is the annuity equivalent to the present value 
(at retirement) of past payroll taxes, capitalised by means of a 5-years moving average of the 
nominal GDP growth-rate. The 1995 reform introduced – at the steady state - a  window of 
eligible ages with actuarially-based adjustment of pensions. These vary between age 57 and 65 
with “actuarial adjustment factors” between 4.720% and 6.136% respectively
24. Capping is 
applied  (on the present value of contributions rather than on pensionable earnings).  
4.2 Simulation methodology  
For each of the five policies described above (four regime changes plus the baseline), we have 
estimate, for each worker in the sample of interest, of the social security wealth variable, of the 
incentive measures. For each worker we also observe a number of covariates such as age, 
occupational status, etc. We simulate retirement decisions of these workers on the basis of the 
econometric model described in Section 3 above, using the social security wealth variable and 
of the incentive measures specific to each regime. All other covariates are identical across 
simulations. In this way, retirement probabilities change in response to changes in the policy 
variables according to the estimated parameters (also shown in Table 3). However, a few 
adjustments are needed in order to adapt the estimates to the policy environment. One of these 
                                                      
24   Hence the benefit is: (33%)*(adjustment factor)*(present value of SS taxes). adjustments concerns the age dummies. To recap we make use of two econometric models: one 
where age enters the specification linearly and is not affected by the reform changes (S1), and 
one where age effects are modelled through a set of age dummies (S3). The coefficients on the 
age dummies of this model are bound to be affected by the reforms over and above the changes 
implied by any modification in eligibility rules. For example in Italy the hazard for men has a 
spike at age 60, which is the normal retirement age for men under the baseline (R0). If the 
normal retirement age is shifted by three years (regime R1) then the age effect observed at age 
60 should be felt at age 63, and the whole hazard should reflect the policy change. 
Simulations are carried out in two steps: the first step generates retirement probabilities under 
the different scenarios, whereas the second step computes the fiscal implications of the changes. 
In order to carry out the exercise we initially focus on an homogeneous group of workers by 
drawing from the original INPS sample a simulation sample of  699 individuals (men and 
women) born in 1938, 1939 and 1940
25. We disregard time differences between these three 
cohorts and simply take everybody to be of age 50 in 1990.  For these individuals we have all 
the relevant information for all ages between 50 and 70, that is we follow the individuals 
through these ages even if some of them have effectively retired in the original sample. The 
intuition behind this procedure is to compute the direct fiscal effects of the reforms (the 
“mechanical effects”) and the fiscal effects due to changes in retirement behaviour (the 
“behavioral effects”) as seen from the perspective of an individual who reaches age 50 in 1990 
and is considering whether to retire at any future age.  
 
 
4.3 Basic Assumptions 
Unlike most other countries in this project, we assume that  men are married to a woman who 
does not work, while working women are single. Hence social security wealth of men can be 
thought of as household’s social security wealth (men are head of the household). This 
assumption is introduced because our data contain no information on workers’ marital status, 
and in the Italian legislation the only major difference between a single worker and a married 
worker is eligibility to survivors’ pension (there is no dependent-spouse benefit
26). We did not 
                                                      
25 There are 235 workers in the cohort 1938, 223 in the cohort 1939 and 241 in the cohort 1940. 
26 There is a difference in the rebates on income tax and in the calculation of “minimum benefit”, particular in the 
way means-testing is carried out. attempt an imputation procedure to assign spouses to workers because these would generate a 
significant amount of noise, while not adding much to the results
27.  
Disability benefits have not been taken into account because multiple exit routes are not relevant 
in the Italian case. Also we do not account for the lump sum benefit occurring at any separation 
between employer and employee (the so called TFR), because as shown in Brugiavini (1999) 
this lump sum benefit does not alter dynamic incentives and would not essentially be affected 
by the reforms.  
 
To complete the simulation we need information on mortality rates and labor force participation 
in the population. A full set of mortality rates for each sex-age-cohort combination has been 
constructed by fitting a grouped-logit model with cohort fixed effects to the sex-age-cohort 
mortality rates obtained from Graziella Caselli and spanning the period 1974-1994. On the basis 
of the mortality rates obtained in this way, and the projected probabilities of exit from the labor 
force projected for each regime, we infer retirement probabilities at each age between 50 and 
70.  We apply to our results an inflation factor that takes into account the fact that we initially 
normalize the size of the cohort to 100 workers aged 50 in 1990. The inflation factor has been 
computed using data from the Italian Labor Force Survey, distinguishing workers by age and 
sex
28.         
Finally, total fiscal effects are evaluated both as a percentage of the gross benefits under 
the baseline regime (obtained directly from the simulation exercise) and as a percentage of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the private sector. In the second case, since our sample is 
confined to private sector employees, we first gross up the results obtained (say total gain/loss 
from the reform) for a single representative individual of the cohort by multiplying by the 
number of employees (men and women) in the private sector belonging to that cohort.
29 The 
                                                      
27 We have assigned to men a wife who is three years younger so that in case of death she is entitled to survivors’ 
benefits. Doing so, and further assuming that women are single, leads to three sources of errors: (a) we overestimate 
benefits to survivors when workers are men, as in reality some of them are single; (b) we underestimate household 
social security wealth by assuming that wives never work and (c) we  underestimate  benefits to survivors of working 
women. We estimated from SHIW Survey that the probability of being married for a man of age 50 is 88%. Of these 
only 35% have a working wife, hence we hope that the combination of overestimation  and the underestimation may 
cancel each other out. In any case it should be noted that none of the reforms changes the basic features of  survivors’ 
benefits.    
28 This step is necessary in order to produce the total gain/loss. More precisely, in 1990 our sample contains 699 
workers born in 1938-1940, an average of 233 workers per annual cohort. According to the Labor Force Survey, the 
population size of these cohorts is of about 193,000 workers, of which 75% are men. Thus, 1 worker in our sample 
represents 193,000/233 = 828 workers in the population. We then multiply our results by the inflation factor in order 
to have the effects for the whole population. 
29 As we said, we deal with the three year-of-birth cohorts as if the workers belonged all to the same cohort. The 
number of employees in the private sector of the cohort 1940 (in fact, an average of the cohorts 1938, 1939 and 1940) 
is 193000.  result of this calculation is the aggregate effect of the reform, which is then divided by the level 
of GDP observed in the year 2001 in the private sector (approximately 994 billions Euro). It 
should be noted that GDP in the private sector represents more than 80% of the Italian GDP.   
4.4  Computing expected benefits and fiscal effects 
Fiscal effects of the reforms are evaluated by computing the net present value of pension 
expenditures for a given cohort aged a in year t (in our case aged 50 in year 1990). We have an 
initial sample of workers (whose number N is normalized to be 100) who can leave the labor 
force through retirement or death. The whole exercise hinges on the definition of total gross 
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D
si p  are, respectively,  the conditional probability of retirement and 
death at age a for individual i. In a general model these probabilities would both depend on 
observable characteristics X, but in our model the retirement probability is individual specific 
(projected) while the probability of death is imputed from external data and depends only on sex 
and age. The terms SSW and SSW
D represent the discounted sum of future benefits that would 
accrue to the worker if alive and retired at each future age a or to her survivor in case of death
30. 
Both are discounted at a 3% real discount rate. 
 
A full evaluation of the fiscal effects of the reforms requires a more general approach to the 
social security budget than can be achieved by looking at the Social Security Administration in 
isolation. Therefore a more general approach is required both from the point of view of the 
workers belonging to the cohort of interest and from the point of view of the Fiscal Authorities. 
As for the former, any change to the social security rules would imply a change in 
retirement/labor supply decisions, which in turn may affect income tax revenue. The latter is 
easily explained by bearing in mind that the Italian pension system is financed on a PAYG basis 
and is systematically running a deficit. Also, different sources of revenue should be taken into 
account, because pension outlays are partially financed through current contributions and 
partially financed through taxation at large. Therefore we cannot identify a specific item of the 
government revenue to be earmarked to finance the social security budget deficit.   For this reason we compute the present value of future taxes that each worker would pay 
conditional on work, retirement or death
31. Looking from the perspective of a worker of age 50: 
for any future year that  she works the worker pays contributions, plus income taxes plus VAT; 
if she retires she pays income tax on gross benefits and VAT;  if she dies her spouse will pay 
income tax and VAT on survivors’ benefits.  Therefore, for any additional year of work the 
value of contributions typically grows, due also to a progressive income tax schedule, while the 
value of gross benefits may increase or decrease according to the rules of the system and 
according to eligibility. 
 
Once the present values of gross benefits and total taxes are known for each individual we select 
the proper weights (which are based on labor force data and depend on individuals’ age and sex) 
and obtain total projected benefits and taxes for that cohort. Hence we can easily compute total 
net expected benefits.  
 
These calculations are carried out for each regime, the final step is to take the difference of the 
total net benefits between each different regime (R1, R2, R3 and R4) and the baseline (R0) to 
compute gains and losses. The simple difference between the two net quantities provides the 
total effects of the reform: 
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Where R1 stands for the first regime (or any of the reforms) while R0 stands for the baseline 
regime and NTSW indicates the present value of total net benefits.  We can also compute the 
mechanical effect and the behavioural effect as follows: 
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The mechanical effect freezes the retirement probabilities at the pre-reform values, so that the 
only changes are due to changes of the social security rules. The behavioural effect maintains 
                                                                                                                                                            
30 It should be noted that while in the econometric exercise we make use of net social security wealth (net of income 
taxes), in the simulation we proceed in two steps, first compute gross social security wealth and then take off all taxes 
when aggregating for all individuals.  
31 A detailed description of the assumptions regarding the tax base and tax rates is given in the Appendix the same value for the net expected benefits (values after the reform) but changes the 




Results are better described by looking separately at each regime change, so that we can 
discuss the simulation strategy implemented in each specific case. An overall summary of the 
results is provided in  Table 4 and Table 5. The former shows the total fiscal impact of the three 
cases R1, R2 and R3  whereas the latter decomposes these total effects into mechanical and 
behavioural effects. It should be noted that, although the results are presented as total effects for 
workers born between 1938 and 1940, the unit of analysis is really the household. To be more 
precise, given our assumptions on marital status, we describe essentially a stylized economy of 
married male workers (in which case we have household social security wealth) and single 
female workers. For brevity in this section we only comment results obtained by making use of 
the option value as the incentive variable.  The full set of results can be found in the tables 
(Table 4 and Table 5) and corresponding figures (Figure 4 through to Figure 29). The total 
effects given in these tables have been obtained by aggregating the individual with weights 
given by the inflation factors described in Section 4 above. Because, as we shall argue, the 
econometric specification based on the linear term does not provide a good representation of the 
behaviour of Italian workers, we focus the attention on the model based on age dummies
32. 
 
R1: Age Shift (plus three years) 
This reform entails a shift of the hazard by three years, while all other features of the social 
security system are preserved as under the baseline. The reform has a direct effect on the hazard 
and  an indirect effect on benefits through eligibility. It should be noted that when using the 
linear age model the projected age profile of labor force exits does not capture well the 
empirical  hazard (Figure1 and Figure 2): exits are evenly distributed over ages and there is a 
hump around age 55 (Figure4). The empirical hazard shows instead higher variability and 
marked spikes at ages 55 and 60 (Figure 1).  Furthermore the age distribution by age of   
retirement rates  is essentially unaffected by the reform (Figure 4). This is because the linear 
                                                      
32 Also, it should be noted that after age 66 there are very few workers left in the data set, so that the estimated hazard 
is very volatile, we decided to set the hazard of exits (for retirement or death) equal to 0.5 after age 66 and equal to 1 term does not pick up any of the policy changes and as a result the behavioral effect is 
negligible.  
For the model with a linear age term, the present value of benefits is reduced by 11.40% 
with respect to the baseline value. Because taxes are also reduced by the reform,  the total net 
change is -9.5% (Table 4). Most of the impact of the reform is due to the mechanical effect (-
9.6%).The behavioural effect, albeit very small, runs opposite to what one would expect (0.1%), 
because retirement probabilities are higher  at younger ages after the reform and precisely at 
those ages losses would be higher (Table 5 and Figure 5).  As for distributional effects Table 6 
shows that losses are evenly spread over the population: it is the next to the highest quintile 
(quintile 4) which suffers most from the reform, but the loss in terms of net present value of 
benefits is not much higher than for the population at large. 
For the model with age dummies retirement probabilities are much closer to the 
emprical hazard and this is clearly shown by the age distribution of labor force exits (Figure 
6)
33. The reform clearly affects the retirement behavior: the distribution of retirement rates is 
shifted toward older ages and also the spikes are observed to occur with three years delay. This 
implies that while a substantial fraction of the losses are suffered at ages 50 through to 57, these 
tend to be very high at ages 55 and 60 (the normal retirement age of women and men under the 
baseline). Older retirees would instead gain from the reform because of an increase in benefits at 
older ages.  
When the econometric model allows for age dummies not only we observe a decline in 
benefits (-14.82% relative to the baseline), but also an increase in the overall fiscal impact 
(4.80%), so that the total net effect is -17.0% (Table 4 and Figures 9 and 10). This is largely die  
to the mechanical effect but a non negligible role is played by the behavioural effect (-7.7%) as 
shown in Table 5 and in Figure 8.  Note that Figure 8 reports the results as a percentage of 
private-sector GDP: these are small  (approximately -0.5% is the total effect) but one should 
bear in mind that social security spending is approximately 14% of total GDP in Italy.  In this 
sense the implied saving for the budget may be non negligible. The distributional effects of the 
reform are significant, with the highest quintile of social security  wealth suffering a loss of 
approximately 20% against  a 12.41% loss of the lowest quintile (Table 7). Hence, according to 
this model, a reform which shifts the retirement age by three years in Italy, would be effective in 
reducing outlays and also progressive.  
                                                                                                                                                            
at the latest age 69. The value 0.5 emerges as the estimated value at age 65, which is the last age where we have 
available a reasonable sample size.  
R2: Actuarial adjustment 
The basic  idea of this Reform is to preserve the status quo in several respects, but to 
introduce an actuarial adjustment in order to guarantee neutrality of the system with respect to 
the retirement age. Before describing the results in detail it is useful to remind the reader that the 
baseline  (pre 1993) is very far from being actuarially fair, as no actuarial penalties are 
envisaged for early retirement (and no bonus for late retirement). 
  As we argued the “linear case” is not very interesting for the Italian system, this can be 
easily understood by looking at Figure 11 and Figure 12, where a very smooth age profile of 
exit probabilities is shown, which is quite different from the observed hazard. 
  Focusing the attention on Figure 13 one can see that  the actuarial adjustment reform  
has some effect on the age distribution of retirement probabilities. In fact, although their basic 
pattern is unchanged after the reform, exits from the labor force are lower at younger ages and 
higher at older ages. Coupled with the actual reduction of benefits that the reform envisages for 
younger retirees (Figure 16), this implies that gross benefits are reduced (-12.93%). Since also 
total taxes are marginally reduced (-1.58%), the net effect is -12.1% of baseline gross benefits 
(Table 4 and Table 5). The effect is largely due to the actual reduction in benefits, i.e. the 
mechanical component is prevalent (-11%), but the behavioural effect goes in the expected 
direction  (Table5 and Figure 15). In terms of private-sector GDP the revenue gains are of the 
order of 0.4 percentage points.  The distributional effects are interesting both in terms of age 
distribution and in terms of welfare. Losses are concentrated in the age group 50 to 57 while 
gainers are retirees aged 58 to 69 (Figure 14).  A  clear ranking also emerges in terms of wealth 
distribution: the highest losses are suffered by the groups of the “rich” retirees  (-15.1% and -
16% respectively for the 5
th and 4
th quintiles of social security wealth, while the “poor” retirees 
gain from this reform (Table 7).  
 
R3: Common Reform 
The common reform is an hypothetical reform which introduces very different rules from the 
ones which are currently in place in Italy.  On average benefits are lower: the gross replacement 
rate for a fully eligible Italian worker is 80% at age 60 under the baseline, but would become 
60% at age 65 under the common reform. Penalties for early retirement are non existent under 
the baseline, but would be substantial under R3. One further important difference is in the 
                                                                                                                                                            
33 Besides changing the eligibility rules, we increment all  age dummies by three years, so that the normal retirement indexation rule: in the pre-1993 system, benefits were indexed to nominal wages, while the 
common reform (as well as the post 1993 regime) only indexes benefits to   prices. It should be 
noted that, in order to identify which specific feature of the reform produced the most important 
changes, we kept the legislation concerning capping and eligibility to minimum benefits 
unchanged with respect to the baseline.   
  Figure 20 show the distribution of labor force exits by age when use is made of the “age 
dummies” model
34. This reform reduces the exit rates at younger ages and shifts their 
distribution toward  older ages. Gross benefits are much lower at all ages, in particular at ages 
between 50 and 60. Table 4 shows that, for all the reasons given above, the total impact on gross 
benefits is huge (-60.8%) but also taxes are lower, particularly income tax, so that the total net 
effect with respect to baseline benefits is -51.1% . This is almost completely explained by the 
mechanical effect which swamps the small gain due to delayed retirement (Table 5). As shown  
in Figure 22 the total effect is quite sizeable in terms of GDP: the fiscal authorities would gain 
approximately 1.6% of private-sector GDP.  
The largest losses are suffered by workers retiring at ages 55 and 60, which are the 
normal retirement ages under the baseline. In general the bulk of the fiscal saving for the 
government comes form the age group 50 to 60 (Figure 21).  In terms of wealth distribution 
everyone loses from the reform, but the “median retiree” appears to lose more (3
rd quintile), 
whereas retirees placed at the lowest quintile suffer the smallest loss (table 9). 
 
 
R4: The Dini reform 
This is an actual reform enacted in 1995 by the Dini government. As described in 
Sections 2 and 3 above, at the steady-state, this reform would  represent a radical departure from 
the baseline in all respects. By introducing a notionally defined contribution method of 
calculation of benefits it implies a potential reduction in the present value of benefits for many 
workers. It also introduces actuarial principles in the benefit computation formula as well as 
indexation to prices. The rules that this reform envisages (we stress, at the steady state)  are not 
dissimilar from what proposed by the common reform (R3).  
                                                                                                                                                            
age is effectively increased by three years.  
34 The effect of the age dummies estimated in the hazard of exits (to retirement and to death) is slightly modified in 
this simulation to take account of the fact that we have implicitly moved forward the normal retirement age. 
Therefore the age effect observed at age 60 should be felt at age 65 after the reform. The change is done through a 
smoothing procedure.        Figure 25 shows the age distribution of exit probabilities, these are all shifted to older ages 
both because we impose that people cannot retire before age 57 and both because incentives are 
such that it is optimal to postpone retirement. The reduction in gross benefits is substantial at 
ages 50 to 60 (Figure 28).   As a results, gross benefits are reduced by 41.53% and taxes 
increase by 16.24% (Table 8). This is due both to a substantial mechanical effect (-31.9%) and a 
marked behavioural effect (-17.1%) which produce a net effect of -49% of benefits. The bulk of 
the losses is concentrated in the age group 50 to 56,  while the older group experiences a gain in 
terms of gross benefits, largely offset by  an  increase in taxes (Figure 26). In terms of the 
private-sector GDP this reform would imply a gain for the government budget of approximately 
1.6%. 
The distributional impact of the reform is somewhat perverse in our simulation, as the highest 
social security wealth quintile gains from the reform while all the rest of the cohort suffers a 
loss, particularly the “median” group (Table 10).   
 
6.Conclusions 
The reform process that many advocate for the Italian social security system has hardly been 
analyzed on micro data. On the other hand, the few econometric studies available do not 
consider the total budgetary implications of the proposed pension reforms. In this paper, we 
offer a novel approach to evaluating reforms which derives the entire range of fiscal 
implications by taking behavioral effects into account. 
Our work builds on the econometric estimates in Brugiavini and Peracchi (2001), based on a 
longitudinal sample of private sector employees provided by the Italian Social Security 
Administration (INPS).  A new release of these by INPS allows us to employ a richer model, 
also briefly described in the paper. 
The simulation exercise considers three hypothetical reforms plus the actual reform introduced 
in Italy in 1995 (the so-called Dini Reform). These reforms are evaluated against a baseline 
represented by the pre-1992 system. The hypothetical reforms range from marginal variation of 
the status to an “ideal” system. The first regime change (R1) is a shift of three years in all 
retirement ages, the second (R2)  proposes an actuarial adjustment to benefits such that early 
retirement is discouraged while providing incentives to delay exits. A reform common to all 
countries participating to the project (R3) allows us to evaluate the effects of a regime change 
that is quite radical in the Italian case, as it implies a sharp benefit cut, an actuarial adjustment, 
and a change in the indexation rules. Finally, a full application of the Dini reform (R4) changes many features of the current system. In particular, it introduces a notionally defined contribution 
method of benefits computation. In several dimensions, this actual reform shows similarities 
with the hypothetical “common reform”.  
The simulations are carried out by focusing on the cohorts of workers born in the years 1938, 
1939 and 1940. For these workers, we construct measures of all the variables of interested, 
including projected probabilities of retirement under each policy regime. 
 
Analyzing the three hypothetical reforms against the baseline, we find that even a modest 
change in the effective retirement age would imply non negligible effects. If measured as a 
percentage of pre-reform gross benefits, losses for the workers in our cohorts are approximately 
17%. Grossing up to the population size of the cohorts considered and measuring as a 
percentage of the Italian output, this change is equivalent to approximately 0.5% of the GDP 
produced in 2001 by the private sector. The losses for the retirees represent savings for the 
government budget that come through reduction in benefit outlays and increases in social 
security contributions, income tax revenue and VAT revenue.   
 
The actuarial adjustment reform and the common reform are particularly interesting for the 
Italian case. The former introduces in the baseline (pre-1993) regime an actuarial adjustment, 
leaving unaffected all other aspects of the social security system. This change has some effects 
on the age distribution of retirement  rates as workers tend to delay retirement. Coupled with the 
actual reduction of benefits that the reform envisages for younger retirees, we obtain a net total 
effect of -12.1% of baseline gross benefits. In terms of GDP, the revenue gains are of the order 
of 0.4 percentage points.  The common reform reduces the probability of exit at younger ages 
and shifts the distribution of retirement rates towards older ages. Gross benefits are much lower 
at all ages, and particularly at ages between 50 and 60. The total impact on gross benefits is 
huge, but due to a reduction in the total tax burden, the overall net effect is a loss to workers of  
51.1% relative to the baseline case. This is almost completely explained by the mechanical 
effect, which swamps the small gain due to delayed retirement. The total effect is quite sizeable 
in the aggregate: fiscal authorities would gain approximately 1.6% of GDP.   
Finally, the Dini reform of 1995 also introduces radical changes in the Italian pension system 
which we evaluate, in our simulations, at the steady state. The age distribution of retirement 
rates is shifted towards older ages both because workers cannot retire before age 57 and because 
incentives are such that it is optimal to postpone retirement. The reduction in gross benefits, 
leading to an almost uniform distribution of benefits under the new regime, is substantial at ages 50 to 60. Overall, the net effect is a  49% benefit loss for workers in the chosen cohorts. If fully 
implemented in 2001, this reform would imply a gain for the government budget equal to about 
1.6% of the private sector GDP. 
The general conclusion is that, in Italy, there is still room for reforms which would 
imply non negligible saving for the government budget. Some of these reforms would also have 
desirable properties in terms of redistribution between generations, and between “rich” and 
“poor” retirees. Further research is needed to assess the effects of these reforms for a larger 
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The Treatment of Taxes and Contributions 
We have made use of four different types of taxes. These are estimated for the years 
between 1973 and 1996 (the period in which we observe the real labour force exit) and then 
projected  20 years forward.   
First we use contributions (or Payroll Taxes) paid by both the employee and the 
employer. The source is INPS ( www.inps.it/Doc/Professionista/aliquote/aliquote.htm) for the 
years 1991 to 2000. For the  years between 1973 and 1990 we refer to “Relazione Generale sulla 
Situazione Economica del Paese” published by Ministero della Programmazione Economica e 
del Tesoro.  The contribution rate paid by employees increases every year, from 0.0635 of gross 
earnings in 1973 to 0.0889 in 1999. The rate paid by employer increases from 0.1345 to  0.2381 
in 1999. 
Next we use Income Taxes both for earnings and for pensions. In Italy there are several income 
brackets attracting different tax rates (see “Testo Unico delle Imposte sui Redditi”). From 1974 
to 1982 we could count  32 income brackets which we grouped into 9 groups in order to 
compare with the legislation of the 1990s. We modify also the tax rates accordingly (these range 
from 10% to approximately 60%). In this dataset we have included also rates to calculate the 
deductions for employees and pensioners. There are different deductions values for every 
income bracket and for every year. 
The third type of taxes are Value Added Taxes which would be collected on 
expenditures. There are mainly four VAT tax rates which apply to different goods and services. 
We create a basket of goods and services with a related prices index. From this we infer an 
average VAT rate to be applied on expenditures. This has been changing every year: the order 
of magnitude is  0.09089 in 1982; 0.09521 in 1983; 0.10763 until 1993 and then decrease 
slightly. As in our data we only observe earnings, we calculate the total value of this tax as a 
percentage of earnings, taking account of the “average propensity to consume”. This is 
approximately 70% of income which is about 55% of earnings. 
 
 Table 1  
Key features of the pre-1993 regime, the transitional phase and the 1995 reform  
(at the steady state). 





Gradually from 60 to 
65 (men) and from 
55 to 
60 (women) 
Any age after 56 (for both 
men and women) 
 
Transition period    
 
     Until about 2035 
Pensionable 
earnings 
Average of last 5 
years of real 
earnings (converted 




Gradually average of 
last 6 to 10 years 
earnings (converted 
to real values through 
price index + 1%) 
Career contributions 
(capitalized  using a 5-
year moving average of 
GDP growth rate) 
Pension benefit  2%*(pensionable 
earnings)*(t), 
where t is years of 




where t is years of 
tax payments (at 
most 40) 
Proportional to 
capitalized value of 
career contributions, the 
proportionality factor 
increasing with age at 
retirement (from .04720 
at age 57 to .06136 at age 
65)  




Cost of living  Cost of living 
Survivor’s pension  60% to spouse 
20% to each child 
40% to each child 





Any age if 
contributed to SI 
for 35 years or 




between 54 and 58  if 
contributed to SI for 
35 years or more, no 
actuarial adjustment 
 (see Table 2) 
None 
Total payroll tax  24.5% of gross 
earnings 
Gradually to 32.7% 
of gross earnings 
32.7% of gross earnings 
 
 
 Table 2:  Eligibility rules for early retirement during the transition 
Year   INPS (Private 
Sector 
Employees) 






Only years of 
contributions 
1998   54 and 35  36 
1999   55 and 35  37 
2000   55 and 35  37 
2001   56 and 35  37 
2002   57 and 35  37 
2003   57 and 35  37 
2004   57 and 35  38 
2005   57 and 35  38 
2006   57 and 35  39 
2007   57 and 35  39 
2008   57 and 35  40 
(*) Source. Ministero del Lavoro – INPS. Rules prevailing after 1998 according to the Law 
449/1997. These rules apply to white- collar employees, they differ only slightly for blue-collar 











 Table 3: Probit Models of Retirement Decisions 
(with Age Dummies) 
 












Male: 20092 obs. 
SSW 0.00058 0.00025 0.00060 0.00028 0.00027  0.00028
Incentive    -0.00103 0.00065 -0.00031   0.00063 -0.00099   0.00036
Constant -1.29995 0.04415 -1.32031 0.04738 -1.27715  0.04400
   
   R
2  
log-
likelihood   R




   0.0836  -7054,7301  0.0835  -7055.8927  0.0840  -7052.1504 
Female: 5165 obs. 
SSW 0.00063 0.00083 0.00157 0.00094 0.00002  0.00097
Incentive      -0.00480   0.00474 0.00443 0.00312 -0.00210   0.00137
Constant -1.18974 0.06768 -1.209801 0.06881 -1.15935  0.07085
   
    R
2  
log-
likelihood   R
2   log-likelihood  R
2   
log-
likelihood 
   0.0314  -2029.3559  0.0316  -2028.872  0.0317  -2028.6804 
 
 Table 4: Total Fiscal Impact of Reforms 
 
  PDV  Total Change Relative to Base          
(in percent) 
        Reform  Reform  Reform 
  Base   Plus 3 
years 
Act. Adjust  Common  Plus 3 
years 
Act. Adjust  Common 
Peak Value – Linear Age 
Benefits 168752  148332 141059 62376 -12.10%  -16.41% -63.04%
Taxes: Payroll  31869  31481 32562 33379 -1.22%  2.17% 4.74%
Taxes: Income  25301  23464 20812 12806 -7.26%  -17.74% -49.39%
Taxes: VAT  16873  15425 15299 10128 -8.58%  -9.33% -39.98%
Taxes: Total  74042  70370 68673 56313 -4.96%  -7.25% -23.94%
Peak Value - Age Dummies 
Benefits 168016  141632 142282 63683 -15.70%  -15.32% -62.10%
Taxes: Payroll  32398  37133 33375 33549 14.62%  3.02% 3.55%
Taxes: Income  25847  25771 22083 13686 -0.29%  -14.56% -47.05%
Taxes: VAT  16879  15731 15448 10186 -6.80%  -8.48% -39.65%
Taxes: Total  75124  78635 70906 57422 4.67%  -5.61% -23.56%
Option Value - Linear Age 
Benefits 168002  148856 142463 61972 -11.40%  -15.20% -63.11%
Taxes: Payroll  32730  32555 32874 32876 -0.53%  0.44% 0.45%
Taxes: Income  25607  23955 21044 12415 -6.45%  -17.82% -51.52%
Taxes: VAT  16959  15633 15457 10031 -7.82%  -8.86% -40.85%
Taxes: Total  75296  72143 69375 55322 -4.19%  -7.86% -26.53%
Option Value - Age Dummies 
Benefits 166778  142067 145207 65357 -14.82%  -12.93% -60.81%
Taxes: Payroll  33387  38048 35399 35079 13.96%  6.03% 5.07%
Taxes: Income  26214  26271 24031 14747 0.22%  -8.33% -43.74%
Taxes: VAT  16949  15905 15907 10515 -6.16%  -6.15% -37.96%
Taxes: Total  76549  80223 75337 60341 4.80%  -1.58% -21.17%
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 Table 5: Decomposition of the Total Effect of the Reforms 
   Change in PDV 
  Plus 3 years  Actuarial Adjustment  Common Reform 
 Mech-  Behav-    Mech-  Behav-    Mech-  Behav-   
 anical  ioural  Total  anical  ioural  Total  anical  ioural  Total 
Peak Value  - Linear Age 
Benefits -19304 -1116 -20420 -28348  655 -27693 -107342 966 -106376
Taxes: Total  -2860 -812 -3672 -6816  1446 -5369 -19824 2095 -17729
Net Change  -16444 -304 -16748 -21532  -791 -22324 -87518 -1129 -88647
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -9.7% -0.2% -9.9% -12.8%  -0.5% -13.2% -51.9% -0.7% -52.5%
Peak Value  - Age Dummies 
Benefits -18878 -7506 -26384 -26564  830 -25734 -105682 1349 -104333
Taxes: Total  -2796 6307 3511 -6317  2100 -4218 -19897 2195 -17702
Net Change  -16082 -13813 -29895 -20247  -1270 -21516 -85785 -846 -86631
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -9.6% -8.2% -17.8% -12.0%  -0.8% -12.8% -51.1% -0.5% -51.6%
Option Value  - Linear Age 
Benefits -18931 -215 -19146 -26305  766 -25539 -106237 207 -106030
Taxes: Total  -2810 -342 -3153 -6224  303 -5921 -19788 -185 -19974
Net Change  -16121 127 -15993 -20081  463 -19618 -86449 392 -86056
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -9.6% 0.1% -9.5% -11.9%  0.3% -11.6% -51.5% 0.2% -51.2%
Option Value  - Age Dummies Benefits -18345 -6365 -24711 -24311  2741 -21571 -104053 2633 -101421
Taxes: Total  -2731 6405 3674 -5670  4458 -1212 -19846 3638 -16208
Net Change  -15614 -12770 -28385 -18641  -1717 -20359 -84207 -1005 -85213
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -9.4% -7.7% -17.0% -11.0%  -1.0% -12.1% -50.5% -0.6% -51.1%
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
 Table 6: Distribution Analysis 
Option Value – Model with Linear Age 
 
   PDV  Change Relative 
          to Base PDV 
         Reform  Reform  Reform 
  Base  Plus 3 years  Act. Adjust Common Plus 3 years  Act.Adjust  Common
Quintile 5 (highest) 
Benefits 13163 11516 10583 4628 -1647  -2580  -8535
After-Tax 
income 11883 10486 10096 5162 -1396  -1787  -6721
Taxes: Payroll  3478 3448 3415 3386 -30  -64  -92
Taxes: Income  4194 3929 3356 2301 -264  -837  -1893
Taxes: VAT  1338 1230 1200 825 -108  -139  -514
Taxes: Total  9010 8607 7971 6512 -403  -1040  -2499
Net Change          -1244  -1540  -6036
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -9.45%  -11.70%  -45.86%
Quintile 4 
Benefits 10603 9281 8336 3081 -1322  -2268  -7522
Taxes: Total  4378 4161 3893 3009 -217  -485  -1369
Net Change          -1105  -1783  -6153
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -10.43%  -16.81%  -58.03%
Quintile 3 
Benefits 8466 7543 7240 2786 -923  -1226  -5680
Taxes: Total  2788 2693 2737 2119 -95  -51  -670
Net Change          -828  -1175  -5011
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -9.78%  -13.88%  -59.19%
Quintile 2 
Benefits 6006 5435 5613 2550 -572  -393  -3457
Taxes: Total  1779 1734 1855 1454 -45  75  -325
Net Change          -526  -469  -3132
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -8.76%  -7.80%  -52.14%
Quintile 1 (lo west) 
Benefits 3763 3441 3849 2455 -322  86  -1308
Taxes: Total  887 859 906 752 -28  19  -135
Net Change          -293  68  -1173
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -7.80%  1.80%  -31.17%
 






 Table 7: Distribution Analysis 
Option Value – Model with Age Dummies 
 
   PDV  Change Relative 
          to Base PDV 
         Reform  Reform  Reform 
  Base  Plus 3 years  Act. Adjust Common Plus 3 years  Act.Adjust  Common
Quintile 5 (highest) 
Benefits 13185  11078 11100 5344 -2107  -2085  -7841
After-Tax income  11839  9936 10255 5585 -1904  -1584  -6255
Taxes: Payroll  3550  4103 3879 3980 553  329  430
Taxes: Income  4283  4304 3927 2884 21  -356  -1399
Taxes: VAT  1348  1283 1281 942 -65  -67  -406
Taxes: Total  9181  9690 9087 7805 509  -94  -1376
Net Change          -2616  -1991  -6465
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -19.84%  -15.10%  -49.04%
Quintile 4 
Benefits 10429  8753 8449 3161 -1677  -1980  -7269
Taxes: Total  4474  4638 4166 3118 164  -308  -1356
Net Change          -1841  -1672  -5912
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -17.65%  -16.03%  -56.69%
Quintile 3 
Benefits 8344  7159 7271 2777 -1185  -1073  -5567
Taxes: Total  2840  2981 2855 2084 141  15  -757
Net Change          -1326  -1088  -4810
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -15.90%  -13.03%  -57.65%
Quintile 2 
Benefits 5970  5212 5613 2559 -758  -356  -3410
Taxes: Total  1785  1873 1865 1387 88  80  -397
Net Change          -846  -436  -3013
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -14.18%  -7.31%  -50.47%
Quintile 1 (lowest) 
Benefits 3769  3319 3875 2509 -450  106  -1260
Taxes: Total  876  894 883 713 18  6  -163
Net Change          -468  99  -1097
Change as a %               
of Base Benefits          -12.41%  2.64%  -29.11%
 







 Table 8: Total Fiscal Impact of the Dini Reform 
 
 
      
   PDV 
Total Change Relative to 
Base 
     (in  percent) 
     Dini  Reform 
   Base  Dini Reform  
Peak Value - Age Dummies 
Benefits 168016 98072 -41.63% 
Taxes: 
Payroll  32398 49780 53.65% 
Taxes: 
Income 25847 23411 -9.43% 
Taxes: VAT  16879 15026 -10.98% 
Taxes: Total  75124 88217 17.43% 
  
Option Value - Age Dummies 
Benefits 166778 97522 -41.53% 
Taxes: 
Payroll 33387 50309 50.69% 
Taxes: 
Income 26214 23617 -9.91% 
Taxes: VAT  16949 15054 -11.18% 
Taxes: Total  76549 88980 16.24% 






   Change in PDV 
 Plus  3  years 
 Mech- Behav-  
 anical  ioural  Total 
Peak Value  - Age Dummies 
Benefits 
-
68054 -1890 -69944 
Taxes: Total 
-
13953 27045 13093 
Net Ch’ange 
-
54101 -28935 -83037 





Option Value  - Age Dummies 
Benefits 
-
67114 -2142 -69256 
Taxes: Total 
-
13895 26326 12431 
Net Ch’ange 
-
53219 -28468 -81687 




17.1% -49.0%  
Table 10: Distributional Analysis of the Dini Reform 
Model with Age Dummies 
 
   PDV 
Change 
Relative 
      to Base PDV 




Quintile 5 (highest) 
Benefits 13185 8759 -4426 
After-Tax income  11839 8013 -3826 
Taxes: Payroll  3550 5133 1583 
Taxes: Income  4283 4346 63 
Taxes: VAT  1348 1298 -51 
Taxes: Total  9181 1323 -7858 
Net Change      3432 
Chenge as a %       
of Base Benefits      26.03% 
Quintile 4 
Benefits 10429 5362 -5067 
Taxes: Total  4474 1226 -3248 
Net Change      -1820 
Chenge as a %       
of Base Benefits      -17.45% 
Quintile 3 
Benefits 8344 4466 -3879 
Taxes: Total  2840 591 -2249 
Net Change      -1629 
Chenge as a %       
of Base Benefits      -19.53% 
Quintile 2 
Benefits 5970 3373 -2597 
Taxes: Total  1785 258 -1527 
Net Change      -1070 
Chenge as a %       
of Base Benefits      -17.92% 
Quintile 1 (lowest) 
Benefits 3769 2435 -1334 
Taxes: Total  876 74 -802 
Net Change      -532 
Chenge as a %       







Figure 1. Empirical hazard from the INPS sample 
 
age
 Men  Women






Figure 2. Empirical survival curve in the INPS sample 
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Figure 4. Three Year Age Shift Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: figures in percentage terms 
Figure 5. Three Year Age Shift Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values  in Euro of the year 2001 
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Base Case Age Shift Reform Figure 6. Three Year Age Shift Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: figures in percentage terms 
 




Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
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Figure 9. Three Year Age Shift Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
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Base Case Age Shift Reform  
Figure 10. Three Year Age Shift Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
 
Figure 11. Actuarial Adjustment Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in percentage terms 
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Base Case Actuarial Adjustment Reform 
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Base Case Age Shift Reform  
Figure 12. Actuarial Adjustment Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
 
Figure 13. Actuarial Adjustment Reform - Option Value 
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Base Case Actuarial Adjustment Reform 
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Gross SSW SSW net of taxes Note: values in percentage terms 
 
Figure 14. Actuarial Adjustment Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
 
 
Figure 15. Actuarial Adjustment Reform - Option Value 
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Figure 16. Actuarial Adjustment Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
 
Figure 17. Actuarial Adjustment Reform - Option Value 
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Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
Figure 18. Common Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in percentage terms 
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Base Case Actuarial Adjustment Reform Figure 19. Common Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
 
Figure 20. Common Reform - Option Value 
 
 


















Base Case Common Reform
 
Note: values in percentage terms 
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Figure 21. Common Reform - Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
 
 
Figure 22. Common Reform - Option Value 
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Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
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Base Case Common Reform Figure 24. Common Reform - Option Value 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
 
Figure 25. 1995-Reform (Dini Reform)- Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in percentage terms 
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Base Case Common Reform Figure 26. 1995-Reform (Dini Reform)- Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
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Mechanical Effect Fiscal Implications of the Behavioural Effect 
Figure 28. 1995-Reform (Dini Reform)- Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
Figure 29. 1995-Reform (Dini Reform)- Option Value 
 
 
Note: values in Euros of the year 2001 
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Base Case Dini